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HOW SHOULD THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS APPLY TO
RELIANCE-BASED CONTRACTS?
By Gregory Scott Crespi*
ABSTRACT
The “sufficient writing” requirements of the Statute of Frauds were
formulated with bargain-based contracts in mind. It is often difficult if not
impossible for persons to meet those requirements for reliance-based contracts,
since this would require them to produce a writing signed by the promisor that
not only sufficiently evidenced the promise, but also provided sufficient
evidence of the other elements of such reliance-based contracts: the
foreseeability of their subsequent reliance upon the promise, the fact of their
reliance, and that failure to enforce the promise would be unjust.
There are several ways that courts can avoid the harsh results of applying the
usual Statute of Frauds sufficient writing criteria to reliance-based contracts:
(1) regard promises made binding through reliance as not constituting
“contracts” subject to the Statute of Frauds, (2) relax the sufficient writing
requirement for reliance-based contracts to require only evidence that the
promise was made, or (3) estop the promisor from asserting a Statute of Frauds
defense, under appropriate circumstances. This short article argues that the third
approach is the best one for courts to pursue, and that sufficient guidance for
courts as to when to apply estoppel is provided by Section 139 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
INTRODUCTION
There are a large number of state and federal statutes, collectively referred to
by lawyers as the “Statute of Frauds,” which bar enforcement of certain specified
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classes of contracts unless those contracts are evidenced by a writing sufficient
to indicate that a contract has been formed, and that is signed by the person
against whom enforcement is sought. There is an extensive body of law relating
to the application of the Statute of Frauds requirements to ordinary contracts
formed by a bargaining process. In this short article I would like to briefly
consider how the Statute of Frauds should be applied to those contracts formed
instead through promissory estoppel—through the reliance of a promisee upon
a promise—rather than through a bargaining process of offer and acceptance.
The elements of a reliance-based contract, as articulated in Restatement
(Second) of Contracts Section 90, are that a promise was made by a promisor
who should reasonably expect that the promisee will rely upon that promise, that
there was subsequent reliance upon that promise by the promisee, and that
injustice to the promisee will result if that promise is not enforced.1 If the Statute
of Frauds is applied to such a contract in the usual fashion, requiring for
enforcement of the contract that the promisee produce a writing signed by the
promisor which is sufficient to indicate that a contract has been formed, it would
not be enough for the promisee to produce a writing signed by the promisor that
only shows that the promisor has made the promise at issue. To be sufficient to
indicate the formation of a contract in this instance, the writing would also have
to evidence the several other elements of a reliance-based contract. It would also
have to show that it was foreseeable to the promisor that their promise would
subsequently be relied upon by the promisee, that the promise was subsequently
relied upon, and that enforcement of the promise is necessary to avoid injustice
to the promisee.
These requirements would often be much more difficult for a promisee to
satisfy than are the Statute of Frauds requirements for enforcing ordinary
bargain-based contracts, where a signed copy of the contract itself, or a signed
acceptance of the offer, or even only a later signed reference to the essential
terms of the contract by the promisor would alone suffice to meet those
requirements. One can envision many instances where all of the elements of a
reliance-based contract could be sufficiently demonstrated by evidence
proffered by the promisee, but where the only writings signed by the promisor
that the promisee can produce provide only evidence that the promise was made,
and not that the promisor could foresee that the promisee would rely on this
promise, nor that the promisee had subsequently relied upon the promise, nor
that injustice to the promise would result from not enforcing the promise. So, the
“sufficient writing” requirement of the Statute of Frauds as it is applied in the
usual bargain-based contract context would often bar enforcement of reliancebased contracts, particularly in the many instances where the promisor has not
in writing later recognized the promisee’s reliance upon the promise. This is a
1. SECTION 90. PROMISE REASONABLY INDUCING ACTION OF FORBEARANCE
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promise or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise. The remedy for breach may be limited as
justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
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seemingly unjust result that would undercut the widely accepted rationale for
recognizing and enforcing such reliance-based contracts.
A court that wanted to avoid barring enforcement of a reliance-based contract
on Statute of Frauds grounds, in cases where there is credible evidence presented
by the promisee that the requirements of such a contract have been met, but
where some or all of this evidence is not contained in a writing signed by the
promisor, would appear to have a choice of three possible approaches to take.
First, at the opposite extreme from requiring that the usual sufficient writing
requirements that apply to all elements of bargain-based contracts also be
satisfied for enforcement of reliance-based contracts, a court could reason that
when a promise is made binding only on the basis of reliance by the promisee,
the situation does not really create a “contract.” That term would be reserved for
bargain-based agreements and not used to describe promises made binding
through foreseeable reliance. In other words, a promise enforced on the basis of
promissory estoppel would be regarded as not constituting a “contractual”
obligation at all, so that the Statute of Frauds simply would not apply to the
promise, allowing for its enforcement.
A more measured, intermediate approach would be to apply the Statute of
Frauds to reliance-based promises made binding through foreseeable reliance,
regarding them as constituting contractual obligations, but significantly relax the
“sufficient writing” requirement for reliance-based contracts to require written
and signed evidence only that the promise had been made. Thus, this approach
would not also require further written and signed evidence that reliance on that
promise had taken place, and was foreseeable, and that injustice to the promisee
would result if the promise was not enforced.
Another possible intermediate approach would be to regard binding
reliance-based promises as again constituting contractual obligations for Statute
of Frauds purposes, therefore requiring that all of the elements of such
obligations be evidenced by a signed writing, but then in appropriate instances
to estop the promisor seeking to invoke the Statute of Frauds to bar enforcement
of those promises, as is articulated by Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Section 139.2

2. SECTION 139. ENFORCEMENT BY VIRTUE OF ACTION IN RELIANCE
(1) a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of a promise or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute
of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remedy for breach is to be limited as justice requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation
and restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in
relation to the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of the
making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise
established by clear and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
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Let me briefly compare the merits of applying the Statute of Frauds to
promises made binding through foreseeable reliance in the conventional manner
that is generally done for bargain-based contracts, with the merits of each of
these three alternative approaches. My conclusion is that the approach of
estopping promisors from raising the Statute of Frauds defense in the context of
a reliance-based contract is the best way to proceed, but only when a balancing
of the several factors set forth in Section 139 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts3 indicates that such an estoppel is justified.
CONVENTIONAL APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS TO
RELIANCE-BASED CONTRACTS
The problem here, as I have briefly discussed, is that the “sufficient writing”
requirements of the Statute of Frauds were formulated with bargain-based
contracts in mind, where signed writings evidencing the existence of all of the
elements of such a contract are often available. The very different requirements
for the formation of a reliance-based contract obviously do not lend themselves
nearly as well to incorporation in a writing signed by the promisor. For a
promisee to satisfy those criteria for a reliance-based contract, they would have
to produce a writing signed by the promisor that not only demonstrated the
making of the promise, but also demonstrated that the promisor reasonably
expected the promisee to rely on their promise, that this reliance by the promisee
has subsequently taken place, and that it would be unjust for the court to not
enforce that promise. It would be a relatively rare case where a promisee would
be able to produce such a comprehensive document signed by the promisor,
given that the writing would necessarily have to have been created after the
promisee had relied on the promise to demonstrate that reliance. The Statute of
Frauds requirements applied in the usual way that they are applied to bargainbased contracts would thus deny enforcement to most reliance-based contracts,
an unjust result that is not consistent with the expansive modern use of the
promissory estoppel doctrine.
DENYING “CONTRACT” STATUS TO RELIED-UPON PROMISES FOR
STATUTE OF FRAUDS PURPOSES
One approach to avoid the result discussed above would be to regard promises
that are binding under Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 90 on the basis
of promisee reliance to not constitute “contracts,” and therefore not governed by
the Statute of Frauds. There are a number of cases that have enforced reliedupon promises but where the courts were insistent that those promises did not
constitute “contracts,”4 and therefore were not subject to Statute of Frauds
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the
promisor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965) (“[I]t would
be a mistake to regard an action based on promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach of
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requirements. In my opinion, the primary problem those courts faced if they did
regard those promises as constituting contracts, at least before the promulgation
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in the early 1970s, was that Section 90
of the Restatement (First) of Contracts did not explicitly invite courts to limit
the award for the failure to perform those relied-upon promises to reliance
damages.5 Some courts were reluctant to award the more generous expectation
damages rather than reliance damages in such situations, and they may have
believed that this was essentially required of them if they determined that a
“contract” promise had been breached.6 So, they were motivated to regard
promises enforceable only on the basis of promise reliance as non-contractual
obligations.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts formulation of Section 90 now has
been modified from the earlier Restatement (First) of Contracts version so as to
explicitly invite courts to limit the remedy for not keeping a relied-upon promise
to reliance damages, if they deem this limitation appropriate. This modification
has therefore removed any possible argument that courts will need to avoid a
“contract” characterization of an enforceable reliance-based promise if they
want to award reliance damages rather than expectation damages as the remedy
for breach. But courts could continue to characterize relied-upon promises as not
constituting “contracts” for the different purpose of evading the restrictive
Statute of Frauds requirements, as they apply to reliance-based contracts, if they
choose to do so. As I have noted above, there is some precedential support in
earlier case law for such a characterization of relied-upon promises as not
constituting contracts.7 However, precedents that call into question the definition
of a settled core legal term such as “contract” are jurisprudentially disfavored

contract action.”). See also Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 326 S.E.2d 395, 406 (S.C.
1985) (“A contract and promissory estoppel are two different creatures of the law; they are not
legally synonymous . . . .”); Eagle Metal Prods., LLC v. Kermark Enters., 651 F.Supp.2d 577, 592
(N.D. Tex. 2009) (“Promissory estoppel is a quasi-contract theory . . . .”); Brandeis Lofts, L.L.C.
v. Great Western Bank (In re Brandeis Lofts, L.L.C.), Bankr. No. BK 07–80482–TLS, Adv. No.
A07-8048–TLS, 2009 WL 2501113, at *6 (Bankr. D. Neb. July 21, 2009) (“[T]he statute of frauds
does not bar a claim of promissory estoppel in a situation where a contract never arose.”); cf. Collins
v. Ace Mortg. Funding, No. 08–cv–01709–REB–KLM, 2009 WL 1796067, at *8 (D. Colo. July
23, 2009) (“[S]tatute of frauds has been found to bar promissory estoppel claims . . . .”). See also
David G. Epstein, Ryan D. Starbird & Joshua C. Vincent, Reliance on Oral Promises: Statute of
Frauds and “Promissory Estoppel,” 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 913, 925 (2010) (“Cases are also on
both sides of the questions whether the statute of frauds applies to a cause of action based on
promissory estoppel . . . .”); Susan Lorde Martin, Kill the Monster: Promissory Estoppel as an
Independent Cause of Action, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 19–28 (2016) (citing numerous
cases holding that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to reliance-based agreements).
5. SECTION 90. PROMISE REASONABLY INDUCING DEFINITE AND SUBSTANTIAL ACTION
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. L. INST. 1932).
6. See Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 276, implicitly taking this position (“Where damages are
awarded in promissory estoppel instead of specifically enforcing the promisor’s promise, they
should be only such as in the opinion of the court are necessary to prevent injustice.”).
7. See cases cited supra note 4.
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because they can cause interpretive difficulties in later cases arising in different
contexts.
RELAXING THE “SUFFICIENT WRITING” REQUIREMENT OF THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS FOR RELIED-UPON PROMISES
Another approach I have noted that courts could follow in applying the Statute
of Frauds requirements to reliance-based contracts in a more permissive manner
would be to be more expansive regarding what writings signed by the promisor
they determine to be sufficient to indicate that a contract was made. For example,
they could regard a signed writing that embodied the promise to be sufficient
even though that writing did not evidence either the foreseeability of promisee
reliance on that promise, the fact of reliance, or the injustice to the promisee of
not enforcing the promise.
This approach of expansively and counterintuitively defining sufficiency may
at first appear untenable, given that the existence of several of the necessary
elements of a reliance-based contract may not be evidenced at all by such a
writing. How could evidence only of the making of the promise, without more,
possibly suffice to indicate that a reliance-based contract has been formed, given
those other necessary elements? But as a close analogy here, there are a number
of cases that find a written and signed offer made in the bargaining context to be
sufficient under the Statute of Frauds to enforce the promises made by the
offeror, even though a signed offer alone is obviously insufficient to indicate
that a contract has been formed since many offers are never accepted.8 This
embrace of the position that a signed offer alone may be sufficient to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds may even be the majority rule, at least at common law if not
under the Uniform Commercial Code.9
One could credibly argue that a written promise alone is just as sufficient a
basis for satisfying the Statute of Frauds for a reliance-based contract as is a
signed offer regarding satisfying these requirements for a bargain-based
contract. Once again, however, precedents that call into question the definition
of an important and relatively settled term such as “sufficient” are
8. In a 2004 article, I cited and discussed a number of cases holding that signed offers are
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, both at common law and under the Uniform Commercial
Code, as well as several cases holding signed offers to not be sufficient. See generally Gregory
Scott Crespi, Is a Signed Offer Sufficient to Satisfy the Statute of Frauds?, 80 N.D. L. REV. 1 (2004).
That principle of the sufficiency of a signed offer may even be the majority rule, at least at common
law if not under the UCC. Id. at 8.
I offered in that article my speculation that in many of those cases holding a signed offer
to be sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the court did not reach that issue until after it had
ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s claim that a contract had been formed, and having done so the court
was then understandably reluctant to let the defendant escape liability for their non-performance
on the technical basis that the evidence that had convinced the court that a contract had probably
been formed was not embodied in a writing signed by the defendant. See id. at 5, 7–8. One could
of course argue that a more candid, estoppel-type articulation of the result reached in those cases,
enforcing the promise at issue notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, would be jurisprudentially
preferable to such a strained interpretation of the phrase “sufficient to indicate that a contract has
been formed,” given that such obviously result-oriented interpretations undermine the clarity of
what are intended to be the relatively bright-line criteria of the Statute of Frauds.
9. Id. at 8.
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jurisprudentially disfavored because they can cause interpretive difficulties in
later cases arising in other contexts.
ESTOPPING THE PROMISOR FROM ASSERTING A STATUTE OF
FRAUDS DEFENSE WITH REGARDS TO A RELIANCE-BASED
CONTRACT
Another approach that courts could follow to avoid the enforceability problem
posed for reliance-based contracts by the Statute of Frauds is to estop the
promisor from asserting the Statute of Frauds defense. This principle is
articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at Section 139 which
enumerates a comprehensive list of factors for courts to consider in determining
whether to deny a promisor the usual right to raise a Statute of Frauds defense.10
These factors include, among others: other evidence outside of signed writings
relating to the foreseeability of the reliance, or corroborating the making of the
promise; the extent of promisee reliance; and the availability of other possible
remedies for the promisee for the non-performance of the promise, such as
quasi-contractual restitution of the value of any benefits conferred upon the
promisor should the action be barred by the Statute of Frauds.11
While the application of Section 139 to estop assertion of a Statute of Frauds
defense for reliance-based contracts is far from universal,12 the use of estoppel
in this fashion is increasingly popular13 and is perhaps now the most common
approach courts use to enforce reliance-based contracts when they have
concluded that the elements of such a contract have been met, and where they
have also determined that estopping the promisor from asserting and prevailing
with a Statute of Frauds defense when the promisee cannot satisfy the sufficient
writing requirement would be a just result under the circumstances. The limited
literature discussing estoppel of the Statute of Frauds defense regarding
reliance-based contracts is generally supportive of the approach articulated by
Section 139,14 although at least one commentator has expressed concern that
courts may go too far in circumscribing the availability of the Statute of Frauds
defense for reliance-based contracts on estoppel grounds.15

10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
11. See id.
12. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 694 (6th ed. 2009) (“The
widespread use of [Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 139] is in its infancy.”).
13. Jeffrey G. Steinberg, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of Frauds,
44 FORDHAM L. REV. 114, 114 (1975) (“An increasing number of cases . . . have demonstrated a
willingness to employ the [promissory estoppel] theory to defeat the operation of the Statute of
Frauds . . . . The trend has culminated in the codification of this new exception to the Statute in
[Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 139].”).
14. See Epstein, Starbird & Vincent, supra note 4, at 941–42. See also Steinberg, supra note
13, at 128–29; Martin, supra note 4, at 19–28 (citing numerous cases allowing estoppel of the
Statute of Frauds for reliance-based contracts).
15. Steven J. Leacock, Fingerprints of Equitable Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel on the
Statute of Frauds in Contract Law, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 73, 131–32 (“[Judicial] reluctance
[to not apply the Statute of Frauds to reliance-based contracts] is motivated by the fear that
unrestrained use of promissory estoppel to bar the defense of the Statute of Frauds will undermine
the statute . . . would subvert the goal of the statute: the prevention of fraud.”).
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CONCLUSION
The “sufficient writing” requirements of the Statute of Frauds were
formulated with bargain-based contracts in mind and are too demanding for most
promisees in reliance-based contracts to satisfy. Some modification of the
protections offered to promisors by the Statute of Frauds against false allegations
is therefore called for with regard to reliance-based contracts. I have briefly
described above three alternatives that courts might choose to take in this regard:
(1) regarding relied-upon promises as not constituting “contracts” subject to the
Statute of Frauds enforceability requirements, (2) relaxing the Statute of Frauds
sufficient writing requirement to require only evidence that the relied-upon
promises were made, or (3) estopping promisors from asserting a Statute of
Frauds defense for reliance-based contracts when the circumstances justify
doing so.
Among these three alternatives I strongly favor the estoppel approach, which
I am pleased to note is increasingly used and is now probably the approach most
often followed by courts in these situations. The other two approaches have
serious shortcomings. Either embracing a counter-intuitively broad definition of
what would be “sufficient” to indicate that the elements of a contract are present
or taking an unduly constrained position regarding when binding obligations
constitute “contractual” obligations would, as I have noted, each have some
precedential support, but in my opinion would be unwise approaches to follow.
Each of these two other approaches would potentially upset settled definitions
of core legal terms that are important in many other contexts. They are therefore
both jurisprudentially inferior alternatives to candidly admitting that justice may
not be served in some instances by allowing a promisor to assert a Statute of
Frauds defense in the usual manner in the context of a reliance-based contract,
at least when there is other convincing evidence available outside of signed
writings as to the elements of such a contract, and when other possible remedies
for the promisee, such as a quasi-contractual recovery of the value of benefits
conferred, would be inadequate. Moreover, the comprehensive factor list
presented in Section 139 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts gives the
courts sufficient flexibility to still allow the assertion of a Statute of Frauds
defense in the reliance-based contract context under those circumstances where
the defense may be needed to protect a person against false allegations as to
promises they have purportedly made and have purportedly been relied upon.
The estoppel approach is therefore the one that I believe that courts should
follow when conventional application of the sufficient writing requirement of
the Statute of Frauds in the context of a reliance-based contract would lead to a
result that is unjust to the promisee.

